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NOTES
ZONING ORDINANCES-CONSTITUTIONAITY.--One of the earliest
ordinances devoted to the proper and orderly distribution of types of
enterprises in a city-in other words the regulation of "uses"-is found
in a decree promulgated by the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte in the
year 1810. In this country, after certain preliminary measures, simi-
lar comprehensive zoning laws were enacted in order to curb the indis-
criminate erection of business buildings and factories in regions of
cities in which quietude comprised one of the important factors in the
value of residence therein. Zoning ordinances came thereafter to be
the rule and not the exception, until those wishing to establish a new
business in a district began to feel the constrictions of the situation,
even as those already settled had felt the oppression and injustice of
the former situation. It was then that someone, wishing to thrust aside
this law which thwarted his business yearning, raised, with temerity,
the constitutionality of the enactment. Let us see some objections
which may be raised under that defense and note their effect in com-
bating the proponents of zoning legislation.
In this country, contrary to the rule prevailing in England, an act
can be held constitutional, only provided that it either does not violate
any superior constitution, or is within the powers delegated or reserved
to the legislative body. The power of the city council is derived from
the state powers and is expressed in the corporate charter granted by
the state. Among the potentialities of the sovereign government is the
capability of legislating for the welfare of its citizens. This is termed
the police power. Practically all zoning ordinances in the United States
are ministrations of the municipality through its police power, which
must first have been granted to it by the central commonwealth gov-
ernment.
Does this type of legislation properly belong under the police power?
First, let us see what such an ordinance includes. The definition is
stated by an expert witness in Kansas City v. Fred Leibi, et al.,' to be:
"An assembling of the uses of lands for their various purposes in given
areas and an attempt to anticipate expansion, and in order to bring
about a greater stability, and an ascertainment of this the uses of the
property in a rational way throughout the city; placing of limiting
lines throughout the city in different areas; classifying their use into,
principally, industrial areas, commercial areas, and residential areas;
and again subdividing those areas into further smaller units for dif-
I Kansas City v. Fred Leibi, et al., 252 S. W. 404 (Mo. 1923).
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ferent uses that would be applicable within its activities . . . and
thereby preventing the very great losses that have occurred in most
American cities by the need of shifting from one area to another, due
to unnecessary or untimely invasion of contrary uses."
Logically, then, the zoning ordinance is primarily intended to pro-
mote the better health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
members of the community. Consequently, if the ordinance is to be
upheld at all, it must involve a valid use of this power, under a specific
delegation from the state. Most states have passed enabling acts
authorizing the cities expressly to pass such zoning ordinances as they
see fit.2 In some states the sanction of the council's action must be
sought in the Home Rule Acts.3 Whichever is made the basis for the
enactment, it is plain that, if the provisions of the act are followed, the
ordinance cannot be overthrown upon the mere basis of lack of power.
The objections which counteract its validity must be those available
against any enactment under the police power. They are, then, the
following: That it is unreasonable; that it has no relation to public
health, safety, morals, or welfare; that it is discriminatory or arbitrary;
that the police power is not validly exercised; that it is an inequitable
enactment, and such like objections. 4 But, even so, these available
must be of such towering strength as to topple over the strong pre-
sumption that the ordinance is a valid exercise of the legislative power.
The presumption always exists until firmly rebutted by its adversaries.
All these criticisms as well as some in addition have been raised at
one time or another in regard to the validity of zoning ordinances. In
some instances one or another of these has prevailed against the law
and the opponents won their battle, but usually this seeming victory
was met by a sagacious change of tact and an amendment or a re-
drafted ordinance mended the weakness.
Zoning flourished until over forty states of the union encouraged
such laws by 1926.6 The constitutionality of the legislation was regu-
larly assailed, and the legislation, in most instances, just as regularly
upheld. From the decisions have evolved certain more or less definite
principles which apply to this type of ordinance. First and foremost,
the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution was not designed to
2 Cal., Col., Conn., Del., Ill., Ind., Ia., Kan., Ky., La. (act and amendment),
Md., (limited) Mass.,. (constitutional amendment), Mich., Minn. (eminent do-
main), Miss., Neb., Nev., N. J., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Penn.,
R. I., S. C., Tenn., Tex, Wis., and Wyo.
a Maine, Missouri, Utah. See Newman F. Baker, The Constitutionality of
Zoning Laws, 20 Ill. Law Rev. 213.
4 See Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning, 68-73.
5 See City of Batavia v. Wiley, 174 N. E. 553, 556 (Ill.- 1931).
6 Baker, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 241.
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and does not curb the regulatory nature of the state police power. 7
Hence, any doubt on that ground as to the constitutionality of any
given enactment must ultimately be resolved in favor of the legislation.
Moreover, "When the subject matter is within the police power of the
state its regulation is within the power of the legislature, but whether
it is within the police power is a judicial question for the courts." 8
Once granted that the contemplated zoning lies within the domain
of the police power, thereafter it can only be attacked as an unau-
thorized and unwarranted exercise of such power. It must be con-
clusively and affirmatively proved that such is the case, for there
is always a presumption that the enactment is valid; 9 and its invalidity
must be clearly shown. 10 Courts have expressly laid down the doctrine
that zoning is a legal invocation of the police power. In Lincoln Trust
Co. v. Williams 11 McLaughlin, J., says: "Municipalities in the exercise
of the police powers may regulate the conduct of an individual and
the use of his property."
The regulation or classification of properties according to uses seems
to be at least impliedly authorized by such courts. But, coming a step
closer, a leading California case 12 involves this conclusion: Where the
question of whether or not a particular business can be conducted in a
residential district without causing undue annoyance to persons living
therein is involved, being one upon which reasonable minds may differ,
the court will not interfere with the act of the municipal corporation
in forbidding such business. In this case the taboo on the maintenance
of a brick-kiln in a residential district was upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States. From the same state comes a compara-
tively late case embodying a rather concise and yet complete statement
of the considerations which such a piece of legislation may undergo in
order to be pronounced in further force. The court says in part: "In
determining the validity of zoning ordinances courts are required to
7 People v. Casa Co., 169 Pac. 454, 456 (Cal. 1917); State v. McCormick,
77 So. 288, 289 (La. 1917); Fitch v. State, 167. N. W. 417, 419 (Neb. 1918).
8 See 3rd. Dec. Dig., vol. 6, p. 593; People v. Gordon, 113 N. E. 864 (Ill.
1916); City of Helena v. Miller, 114 S. W. 237 (Ark. 1908); Ex Parte McCoy,
101 Pac. 419 (Cal. 1909).
9 City of Batavia v. Wiley, op. cit. supra note 5; Sitterle v. Victoria Cold
Storage Co., 33 S. W. (2d) 546, 548, 549 (Tex. 1930).
10 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 31 (1905); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113
(1876). See also in this connection the famous cases of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S.
87 (Mass. 1810), and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. .625 (N. H.
1819).
11 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams, 128 N. E. 209 (N. Y. 1920).
12 Ex Parte Hadacheck, 132 Pac. 584, 586 (Cal. 1912).
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determine, in addition to the need thereof, whether or not they are
arbitrary and discriminatory and have any reasonable tendency to pro-
mote public health, safety, morals, and general welfare." 13
At the same time, however, the courts abhor judicial supervision of
the municipal government, 14 and steadfastly refuse to overthrow their
enactments unless the defect in the law is made dearly to appear, to
an extent that it cannot possibly be upheld. Some courts have swung
so far in their leniency as to declare that the ordinance will be upheld
if there could have been a valid basis for its enactment.15 The major-
ity, though, confine their reasoning to certain definite channels, involv-
ing rather precise objections which may be employed to thwart the
municipal government. The law must have no relation to public health,
welfare, and morals, 16 or must be unreasonable, and this must be
plainly apparent upon an examination of the situation presented. 17 If
the invalidity of the law is relied on, this, likewise, must be made clear-
ly manifest. However, before investigating these various obstacles in
detail which have been sought to be interposed in the, path of classifi-
cation ordinances, let us refer to the conclusion drawn by Mr. Metzen-
baum, successful counsel for the city in Euclid Village v. Ambler Realty
Co.: 18 "Unless a zoning ordinance can successfully meet the require-
ment of being reasonable in its application to any particular condition
or situation, and unless it is enacted for the purpose of protecting the
public safety, health or welfare, it cannot be expected to meet with
the approval of the courts."
The zoning plan is not to be thought of as A panacea for all city
ills; neither is it to be applied in the manner of "soothing syrup" to
every conceivable municipal condition. "Moderation in all things"
finds no exception in this method of municipal control. The courts have
consistently held the ordinance must be reasonable in its application or
this well-aimed objection will prevail against it. Even so, however,
the courts have applied the preceding maxim to their own judicial
13 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 234 Pac. 381 (Cal. 1925).
14 Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 27 (Cal. 1884); Armour & Co. v. North
Dakota, 240 U. S. 513 (1915); Jacobson v. Mass., op. cit. supra note 10.
15 "If no state of circumstances could exist to justify a certain statute, then
we may declare this one void, because in excess of legislative power of this State,
but if it could we must presume it did." Munn v. Illinois, op. cit. supra note 10,
at p. 132. Chicago R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 280 Fed. Rep. 393 (Minn.
1922); Miller v. Board of Works, op. cit. supra note 13. And see Metzenbaum,
op. cit. supra note 4, at pp. 76-77.
16 State v. City of Jackson, 133 So. 114, 116 (Fla. 1931); Gundling v. City
of Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 188 (Ill. 1900).
17 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 177 (Ark. 1914), and cases cited
therein; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 529 (1916).
18 Euclid City v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 395 (Ohio 1926); Met-
zenbaum, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 7.
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action and consequently have laid down the primary rule that "An
ordinance is not unreasonable merely because particular judges may
think that it goes further than is necessary or convenient." 19 And in
fact one justice expressed the opinion that the law under consideration
was not commendable; yet he could not declare it unconstitutional,
since it did not violate any of the categories with which such a law
must comply.20 Moreover, because the courts will not supplant the
legislature, 21 he was constrained to give effect to their promulgation.
A further restriction on the power of the judiciary to defeat such legis-
lation is involved in an Illinois decision, where it was decided that an
ordinance would not be declared invalid as unreasonable if it was
within the power of the municipal authority which enacted it, for the
reason that the expediency and propriety of the act is not a subject
for judicial inquiry. 22 A subsequent zoning ordinance case from the
same state elaborated the question still more, in haec verba: "A court
will not hold an ordinance void as unreasonable where there is room
for a fair difference of opinion on the question, even though the correct-
ness of the legislative judgment may be doubtful, and the court may
regard the ordinance as not the best which might be adopted for the
purpose." 23 In line with this viewpoint the courts, as a general rule,
maintain the view that the ordinance must be plainly and palpably
unreasonable before they will interfere with its operation.
24
In direct application to a particular type of zoning regulation, the
United States Supreme Court delivered itself of the following opinion:
"Regulations in regard to the height of buildings and in regard to their
mode of construction in cities made by the legislature for the safety,
comfort, or convenience of the people, and for the benefit of the prop-
erty owners generally, are valid." 25 Generally, then, it is the tendency
to sanction zoning measures under a consideration of their status as
reasonable or unreasonable restrictions, and from that aspect a reason-
able and valid use of the far-reaching police power. Yet this attitude
does not give rise to a blind, unlimited affirmance of such regulations
19 19 R. C. L. 113, p. 809; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 72 Pac. 970 (Cal. 1903);
State v. Clifford, 128 S. W. 755 (Mo. 1910); Indiana R. R. Co. v. Calvert, 80
N. E. 961 (Ind. 1907).
20 American Wood Products Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 21 Fed. (2d) 440,
444, 445 (1927); and see note 64 A. L. R. 920, 923-4.
21 Barbier v. Connelly, op. cit. supra note 14; Armour & Co. v. North
Dakota, op. cit. supra note 14.
22 Daniels v. City of Portland, 265 Pac. 790, 792 (Ore. 1928).
23 Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners v. City of Chicago, 154 N. E. 131, 134
(Ill. 1926).
24 Reinman v. Little Rock, op. cit. supra note 17; Gitlow v. New York, 268
U. S. 652 (N. Y. 1924).
25 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 106 (Mass. 1909).
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for if the objection be of great weight it will overcome the sanctioning
state of mind, even so. From the State of Oregon comes the precise
statement of the rule in this connection. "When the legislative enact-
ment is manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary . .. it becomes the duty
of the judiciary to declare such act invalid." But one asserting its in-
validity has the burden of proof.2 6
Necessarily, therefore, the decision whether a given zoning ordin-
ance is or is not a reasonable one rests ultimately for. its basis upon
the provisions of the ordinance, its application and effect, and the ade-
quacy of the proof in overcoming the presumption of sufficiency.
The whole foundation of the right to enact extraordinary measures
for the regulation of the community is posited upon the theory that a
government should have a capacity to enact such laws as will be con-
ducive to the best general welfare of its citizens. The law-makers may
interfere to a reasonable extent with practically any right of a citizen
the exercise of which is inconsistent with public health, morals, and
welfare. The right of property is by no means exempt from this power,
as witness an opinion of Mr. Justice Day's, in which he says: "True
it is, dominion over property springing from ownership, is not absolute
and unqualified. The disposition and use of property may be controlled
in the exercise of the police power in the interest of public health,
convenience or welfare... Certain uses of property may be confined to
portions of the municipality other than the resident district . . . be-
cause of the impairment of the health and comfort of the occupants of
neighboring property." 27
Classification laws, involving those elements, then are valid, but
lacking this foundation they cannot be supported upon any ground.
And where an objection is raised involving a denial of these interests,
it devolves upon the courts to determine whether the exercise of the
police power is really for the best interests of the public.28 The or-
dinances must have a real concern for public welfare and cannot be pro-
mulgated, so as to withstand objection, under mere color of public be-
neficence. The courts will declare invalid a law which is a mere pretense
to protect public health, or which passes "entirely beyond the limits
which, bound the police power, and infringes upon rights secured by the
fundamental law." 29 And where the contrary is set up, the judiciary
will promptly abrogate the law. 80
26 Daniels v. City of Portland, op. cit. supra note 22.
27 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 71, 74-75 (Ky. 1917).
28 Replogle v. Little Rock, 267 S. W. 353, 354 (Ark. 1925).
29 Ex Parte Whitwell, 32 Pac. 870, 872 (Cal. 1893).
30 Dornberg v. City of Spokane, 215 Pac. 518, 519 (Wash. 1923); Thomas
Cusack Co. v. Chicago, op. cit. supra note 17; Gundling v. City of Chicago, op.
cit. supra note 16.
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Municipalities may not, under the guise of the police power, formu-
late and apply restrictions having no real relation to public welfare,
since automatically the enabling element is withdrawn and the enact-
ment must fall under attack, for the police power is confined to such
reasonable restrictions as are necessary to public health, morals and
safety, and to the public peace, order and general welfare, and or-
dinances under such power may be enforced though they interfere
with the right of property.3 1 "An ordinance prohibiting all sales at
auction within a prescribed portion of the business district.., is unrea-
sonable and void, as it can have no relation to health, comfort, morals,
or welfare." 82
It is considered to be for the best interests of the municipal public
that the council prohibit or regulate and classify uses injurious, or like-
ly to be injurious, to the members of the city. Or, in the words of
Justice Cooley, "A specific occupation or business may be excluded
from a prescribed area in a municipality, or it may be required to be
conducted within prescribed limits, where it injuriously affects the
health, safety, comfort, or welfare of the coinmunity." 8s
Some states have even gone so far, as in Maryland, to hold that,
"Where an ordinance does appropriate private property to a public
use, or if it does deprive- owners of their property without compensa-
tion, then such an invasion of private rights cannot be sustained under
the police power unless the exercise of these rights menaced the public
health, safety, or morals." 84 This, in effect, says that, the proper
conditions being present, such taking of private property without com-
pensation is justified under the "health, morals and welfare" feature
of the police power.
It follows that, very generally, industries and business may-be lo-
cated and the recipient section classified, certain establishments pro-
hibited from operating or locating in certain sections; others from set-
ting up in still other zones, all provided that such distribution bears
some relation to the communal "health, safety, public convenience or
comfort or general welfare." 85
Another invalidating criticism of a classification ordinance is that
it is in its application arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore can-
not be given effect for the general welfare, but in its largest view would
only go to the advancement of a special class. The Alabama Supreme
31 Wiseman v. Close, 183 N. Y. S. 353 (N. Y.' 1920).
32 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 1315. Dornberg v. City
of Spokane, op. cit. supra note 30.
33 Cooley, op. cit. supra note 32, at p. 1315; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U. S. 394 (Cal. 1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, op. cit. supra note 17.
34 Goldman v. Crowtbier, 128 Ati. 50 (Md. 1925).
35 Metzenbaum, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 69, § H, and cases cited.
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Court gives a compact summary of this objection in these words: "Or-
dinances may be condemned as arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory,
and not uniformly burdening those in the same class." 36 Necessarily,
all zoning ordinances, as all boundary-defining laws, partake to some
degree of arbitrariness. So, too, taken from a highly individualistic
viewpoint, they are discriminatory, since no two portions of land are
similarly situated, nor will the law have exactly the same effect on each.
Nevertheless, this element, in a well-applied ordinance, is not of suffi-
cient gravity to outweigh the reasonableness and beneficence of the
law. As was said by Mr. Justice Field, of the United States Supreme
Court: "Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits ...
Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight
upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose un-
equal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as
little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good." 37
If there be a reasonable inference of the freedom from the nature
of an arbitrary fiat, i. e., unless there can be no reasonable difference
of opinion but that the ordinance is arbitrary and inequitable, the legis-
lative expression must be given full effect.38 Here, again, is shown the
impregnable character of the presumption which accompanies and pro-
tects the zoning enactments of the municipal body. The ordinance
must be shown strongly to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. The
general rule is embodied in a decision of the State of Illinois, wherein
it is said that "Classification is primarily for the Legislature, and only
becomes a judicial question when the legislative action is clearly un-
reasonable." 39
In several cases, the absolute exclusion of all but certain named in-
dustries from a residence district, although seemingly discriminatory
and arbitrary, has been upheld.40 It would seem, then, that the degree
of discrimination must be of such seriousness as practically to amount
to a denial of the owner's status as a member of the public or to involve
the aspect of individual legislation directed at his rights. In such case
it would be highly inequitable to enforce the legislator's whim, nor
could it be supported as a proviso for general welfare.
The common attitude of courts in general on the subject has been
expounded by Mr. Alfred Bettman, of the Ohio Bar, in these words:
"The true principle would seem to be that, if the districting in general
36 Town of Guntersville v. Wright, 135 So. 634 (Ala. 1931).
37 Barbier v. Connelly, op. cit. supra note 14.
38 State v. City of Jackson, op. cit. supra note 16.
39 People v. Gordon, op. cit. supra note 8.
40 See Ex Parte Quong Wo, 118 Pac. 714 (CaL 1911); Brown v. City of
Los Angeles, 192 Pac. 716 (Cal. 1920). See also Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality
of Zoning, 37 Har. L. Rev. 850.
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cannot be shown to have disregarded the reasonable dictates of equali-
ty, it should be upheld. Here, as elsewhere, in the realm of the due-
process and equality clauses, general considerations and not particular
instances should govern, and here, as elsewhere, there is no escape from
questions of degree." 41
As has been stated heretofore several times, the power of zoning
is derived from and dependent on the general police power. An ordi-
nance may be assailed from the standpoint of its source of sanction.
A successful showing that the ordinance in question extends beyond the
general regulatory power of the government renders it, ipso facto, of
no force and effect, whereupon it becomes the duty of the judiciary so
to declare it.
However, in accord with the general attitude toward police power
regulations, provided first of course that every charter provision neces-
sary to give them legal existence has been complied with,42 the tri-
bunals are very reluctant to declare a promulgation of the city to be
outside the pale of its jurisdiction.
Consequently, many cases from a great number of states attest the
validity of general zoning provisions as within the municipal police
power.43 Likewise many special types of ordinances have been upheld,
at least from the standpoint of being a valid exercise of that capacity.
4 4
Not all use prohibitions have found favor in the eyes of the judi-
ciary as laudable ministrations of the policing quality. A few ordi-
nances, not varying essentially in principle from those sustained in
other jurisdictions, have been abrogated by the state courts of last re-
sort. In Minnesota, where zoning laws have been notably turbulent,
an enactment prohibiting the owner of land from erecting a store build-
ing upon his property within a residential district was not upheld as a
legitimate invocation of the police power.45 A similar ordinance was
denounced in West Virginia,46 as also was one in Colorado.
47 It is
generally conceded that an attempt to describe set-back or building
41 Bettman, op. cit. supra note 40.
42 State v. City of Jackson, op. cit. supra note 16.
43 Fourcade v. San Francisco, 238 Pac. 934 (Cal. 1925).
44 Reinman v. Little Rock, op. cit. supra note 17; R. B. Construction Co. v.
Jackson, 137 Atl. 278 (Md. 1927) (An ordinance contemplating that within a
certain district there should be reserved on each lot one side yard at least a foot
wide was adjudged a valid use of the police power in an attempt to improve the
condition of light and air).
45 State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 158 N. W. 1017 (Minn. 1916).
And see People v. City of Chicago, 103 N. E. 609 (11. 1913).
46 State ex rel. Austin v. Thomas, 123 S. E. 590 (W. Va. 1924).
47 Willison v. Cooke, 130 Pac. 828 (Colo. 1913).
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lines, unless involving a comprehensive plan of zoning, is very unsub-
stantial and shaky on a foundation of police power sanction.48 Ordi-
nances based upon a mere endeavor to obtain some aesthetic effect are
likewise very generally held ineffective.
49
In conclusion upon this subject of the constitutionality of zoning
ordinances, the rule to be drawn from the adjudicated cases seems to
be aptly stated thus: "A municipal corporation under its authority of
the police power may regulate any trade, occupation or business, the
unrestrained pursuit of which might affect injuriously the public health,
morals, safety or comfort, and in the exercise of this power particular
occupations may be excluded from certain parts of the city or may be
required to be conducted within certain limits." 50
Or, as further condensed by Teideman, "The police power is proper-
ly confined to the determined enforcement of the legal maxim 'sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.' " 51
From all this a conclusion is evolved which practically justifies the
use of the zoning ordinance in the proper government of our cities in
their rapid and intensive growth. To put it tersely, "The right to im-
pose reasonable restrictions as to the nature and use of buildings in a
city is unquestionably within the police or regulating power." 52 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts summarizes the basis of zon-
ing thus: "The right to enjoy life and liberty and to acquire, possess
and protect property are secured to everyone under the Constitution of
Massachusetts and under the Constitution of the United States. These
guaranties include the right to own land and to use and improve it ac-
cording to the owner's conception of pleasure, comfort or profit, and
of the exercise of liberty and the pursuit of happiness.... These rights
are in general not absolute and unqualified. Liberty is regulated by
law to the end that there may be equal enjoyment of its blessings by
all." 5
Francis W. Brown.
48 Fruth v. Bd. of Affairs, 84 S. E. 105 (W. Va. 1905); Eubank v. Richmond,
226 U. S. 157 (Va. 1914).
49 People v. City of Chicago, op. cit. supra note 45; 19 R. C. L., pp. 834-835.
50 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, op. cit. supra note 33.
51 27 Har. L. Rev. 297, 309, Wickersham, Geo. W., The Police Power, A
Product of the Rule of Reason, referring to a statement of Professor Teideman
in the preface to his treatise, State and Federal Control of Persons and Property
in the United States.
52 Note, 13 Har. L. Rev. 405, citing Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315
(1872).
53 Brett v. Bid. Comm. of Brookline, 145 N. E. 269, 270 (Mass. 1924).
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DAMAGES FOR FmIGHT-NEGLIGENcE-AssAuLT.-In Comstock v.
Wilson I the plaintiff's testatrix was a passenger in plaintiff's car when
it collided with an automobile operated by defendant. The collision
caused some noise or "grating sound." The left fender of plaintiff's
car was loosened from the running board. The plaintiff's testatrix
stepped from plaintiff's automobile and started to write down defend-
ant's name and license number. While doing so, she fainted and fell
to the sidewalk, fracturing her skull. All this occurred within a few
minutes after the accident. She lived about twenty minutes after the
fall. Plaintiff, claiming that the death of testatrix was the result of de-
fendant's negligence, recovered judgment for $5,000 against defendant
in the trial court. The trial judge submitted to the jury as a question
of fact, whether the alleged negligence of defendant was the proximate
cause of the death of plaintiff's testatrix. He refused the defendant's
request to charge that "if the jury find that the deceased at the time
of the collision sustained nly shock or fright, without physical injury,
they must find for the defendant." Defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, and this court certified the question as to
whether or not it was error for the trial court to refuse defendant's
request to charge. The Court of Appeals held it was not error to refuse
defendant's request and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The rule in England, Scotland and Ireland appears to be settled in
favor of a recovery for physical injuries resulting from nervous shock
caused by the wrongful act of the defendant without actual impact.
2
The American authorities are in conflict on this question. In a number
of jurisidictions, recovery for nervous shock without impact has been
denied. The reasons assigned by the courts for denying recovery in this
class of .tases are: (1) mere fright produced by negligence is not
recognized by the law as the foundation of an action;s and since
fright is not itself a cause of action, none of its consequences are; (2)
the injuries resulting from fright are considered by law as too re-
mote;4 and (3) it is contrary to public policy to allow recovery in
such cases.5
In the law of assault, liability for fright without impact has always
been recognized. But the wrongful act of defendant in assault is quite
different in nature from that of a defendant in the law of negligence.
1 177 N. E. 431 (N. Y. 1931).
2 Archibald H. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 Har. L. Rev. 260.
3 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
4 Braun v. Craven, 175 Iii. 401 (1898); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13 (1909); Miller v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 78 Ohio St.
309 (1908).
5 Ewing v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40 (1892); Ward v. West
Jersey, etc., R. Co., 65 N. J. L. 383 (1900).
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At the time when liability in trespass for an assault was first imposed
the interest in freedom from mental disturbances was not recognized
as worthy of legal protection. 6 "Even today it [this interest] is, save
in exceptional cases, given only an indirect recognition and protec-
tion." 7 The interest recognized in assault is an interest in freedom
from being put in apprehension of a touching offensive to a reasonable
sense of personal dignity. The apprehension must be of an intentional
touching. There is no liability in law of assault for unintentionally
causing the most reasonable apprehension of loss of life or limb. 8
Therefore liability in assault was not imposed because freedom from
this particular form of mental disturbance was regarded by early com-
mon law as so peculiarly desirable as to require its legal recognition
and protection. "Its [liability in trespass for an assault] existence
can be explained only as a result of the fact that, whatever may have
been the purpose underlying the introduction of the writ of trespass,
it lay only where the plaintiff was seeking compensation for the griev-
ance caused him by some breach of the King's peace, and so was used
as a means of punishing such offenses." 9
The problem involved in the law of negligence is quite different.
A resort to the law of assault will not assist in solving the problem.
While many forms of mental disturbance are provable in aggravation
of damages and can be recovered where defendant has violated some
legally protected interest of the plaintiff, the problem is quite differ-
ent where the liability of the defendant depends upon the fact that
he has caused some form of emotional disturbance to the plaintiff
and it is here that the courts have disagreed upon the question as to
whether a recovery is desirable.1 0
Negligence per se is not actionable, but negligence causing physical
injury is actionable. The courts did not seem to have any difficulty
in holding a defendant liable where his conduct was careless and re-
sulted in a physical injury through the medium of a nervous shock;1 1
6 Torts, Treatise No. 1 (a) Supporting Restatement No. 1, p. 64.
7 Torts, op. cit. supra note 6.
8 Torts, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 65.
9 Op. cit. supra note 8.
10 That recognition is given to the interest in privacy, a very intangible in-
terest, see Samuel D. Warren, Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Har.
L. Rev. 193.
11 Accord: Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298 (1918); Goddard v. Watters,
14 Ga. App. 722 (1914); Purcell v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 34 (1892);
Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316 (1916); O'Meara v.
Russell, 90 Wash. 557 (1916).
Contra: Haile's Curator v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 60 Fed 557 (1894); Terre
Haute Electric R. Co. v. Lauer, 21 Ind. App. 466 (1899).
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and neither did they have any difficulty in holding a defendant liable
in damages for a nervous shock produced intentionally but where there
was no impact.12 Recovery for fright or nervous shock has been denied
regardless of however manifest in physical consequences, unless, as
Dean Pound points out "the causal nexus was vouched for by an in-
tention to injure or by some physical impact at the time the fright or
mental suffering was culpably produced." 13 Dean Pound says that
this was a practical rule, growing out of limitation of trial by jury,
the difficulty of proof in cases of injuries manifested subjectively only,
and the backwardness of our knowledge with respect to the relations
of mind and body.14 With the rise of modern psychology, the diffi-
culty of proving an injury of this type and the extent of such injury,
has been removed. But, as Dean Pound points out,15 a legal concep-
tion had come into being, viz., the right of physical integrity as in-
cluding integrity of the physical person but not mere peace of mind,
which the courts treated as self-sufficient. This conceptual attitude
is rapidly disappearing. The courts are coming to look upon a nervous
shock as an affection of the physical person, not the mental. 1
The right to be secure from nervous shock is a right that should
be recognized with the right to be secure from bodily injury. When
the nervous shock is accompanied with physical injury, damages are
allowed in the majority of cases for the fright. The ability of a jury
or the court to estimate the amount to be recovered for the fright
should be the same whether there is physical. injury or not. The
argument that fictitious claims may be fabricated has no more
strength than it would have in cases where there has been a physical
injury, there being the same privilege of employing expert testimony
to refute any false claims as is done in cases of physical injury.
Thomas E. Cougidan.
12 Rogers v. Willard, 223 S. W. 15; 144 Ark. 587 '(1920); Holdorf v.
Holdorf, 185 Iowa 839, 169 N. W. 737 (1918); Williams v. Underhill, 63 App.
Div. 223, 71 N. Y. S. 291 (1901); Brownback v. Frailey, 78 Ill. App. 262 (1898);
Preiser v. Wielandt, 62 N. Y. S. 890 (1900).
13 Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, p. 120.
14 Pound, op. cit. supra note 13.
15 Pound, op. cit. supra note 13.
16 Sloane v. So. Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 (1896); Mack v.
South Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1897); Watson v. Dilts, 116
Iowa 249, 89 N. W. 1068 (1902).
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JUDGMENT-FEDERAL COuRTs-TERRITORIAL ExTENT OF JUDGMENT
LIENS IN INDIANA.--The decision handed down by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Rhea v. Smith1 brings into ques-
tion the validity of the Indiana statutes with reference to the terri-
torial extent of judgment liens of the federal courts. In that case
the plaintiff purchased land at an execution sale on a judgment ren-
dered in the federal district court in Missouri. The defendant claimed
as a purchaser of the same land from the original owner subsequent
to the rendition of the judgment, of which no transcript had been
filed, but prior to the execution sale. On certiori it was held that the
judgment be reversed, since the Missouri statute was in conflict with
the Act of Congress of 1888, and filal judgment was given for the
plaintiff in the case. This Act of 1888 2 provides that judgments and
decrees rendered in a circuit of district court of the United States
within any state, shall be liens on property throughout such state, in
the same manner and to the same extent and under the same conditions
only as if such judgments and decrees had been rendered by a court
of general -jurisdiction of such state. The Missouri statutes on this
point 1 provide that federal judgments shall be liens in any county
upon the filing of ;the transcript of the judgment in the state circuit
court of that county but makes judgments rendered by any court of
record liens in the county for which the court is held without the filing
of a transcript. The Supreme Court held that this statute was in con-
flict with the Act of 1888, in that it was an unjust discrimination
against the federal courts, making their judgments a lien on property
only when recorded, while judgments of state circuit courts were liens
on the property in the county in which they were rendered, ipso facto.
The Indiana statutes on this point seem to be open to the same
criticism. In Section 659 of Bum's Indiana Annotated Statutes, 1926,
the legislature provided that all final judgments in the supreme and
circuit courts for the recovery of money or costs, shall be a lien on
real estate and chattels real liable to execution in the county where
judgment is rendered. This statute does not make the filing of the
judgment a prerequisite to the creation of the lien, and therefore makes
the lien attach automatically on the rendition of the judgment. In
Section 664 it is provided that any person interested may file or cause
to be filed, in the office of the clerk of any circuit court of this state
a copy of any judgment rendered by the district or circuit courts of
1 274 U. S. 434, 71 L. Ed. 1139 (1926).
2 C. 729, 25 Stat. at L. 357, U. S. C. A., title 28, § 812.
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) c. 12, §§ 1554-56.
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the United States in and for the District of Indiana, and when so
filed shall be a lien. This seems to be in conflict with the Act of 1888,
in that it discriminates unfairly .against the judgments of the federal
courts.
It would seem, therefore, that these Indiana statutes are ineffective.
What then is the status of judgment liens of federal courts in Indiana?
Since the statutes of Indiana do not conform to the 'Act of 1888, the
procedure in effect before the passage of that act is the procedure that
will now govern. Before that time the judgments of both state and
federal courts created liens on property coextensive with their juris-
dictions.4 However, since federal courts had jurisdiction over many
counties, states began to pass statutes making registry of federal judg-
ments a prerequisite to their becoming !. lien, in all counties except
the county in which the judgment was declared. On the other hand,
judgments of county courts did not have to be so recorded in order
to become liens. To overcome the confusion necessarily arising from
this diversity of practice, the Act of 1888 was passed. Where state
statutes were in conflict with this act, then the old rule of coextension
still applies. And therefore, since it seems that the Indiana statutes
are in conflict with the act, .the rule of coextension applies in this
State, making the judgment of a federal court a lien on all the real
property within its jurisdiction ipso facto.
Jo/n M. Crimmins.
AUTOMOBILES - CONDITIONAL SALES - AUTOMOBILE SALE AND
TRANSFER AcTs.-Does a compliance with the provisions of an Auto-
mobile Sale and Transfer Act, in selling a car, operate to give notice
to an intending subsequent transferee of an interest in the car de-
scribed in the bill of sale of the car? Or is it necessary in order to
protect the seller under a conditional sales contract that he also record
his conditional sales contract? Thus the question is presented as to
whether the Automobile Sale and Transfer Acts, in the scope of their
operation, supersede the Chattel Mortgage Recording Acts.
Apparently the first decision on this question was handed down by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Carolina Discount Corpora-
tion v. Landis Motor Co.' In this case the owner of the car mortgaged
it to the Carolina Discount Corporation and the mortgagee failed to
record this mortgage as required by the statute in regard to chattel
mortgages. Later the original owner sold the car to the defendant,
representing it to be free from all encumbrances. The mortgagee
4 See Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. Bates, 44 Fed. 546, 549 (Cir. Ct., D. Kan.,
1890).
1 129 S. E. 414 (N. C. 1925).
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sought to recover the car claiming that the Automobile Registration
Act repealed the statute requiring the recording of chattel mortgages.
The court, after a perusal of these two statutes, decided that the
scope of operation of the Chattel Mortgage Recording Statute is not
affected by the Automobile Sale and Transfer Act, and that all chattel
mortgages and conditional sale contracts on motor vehicles must be
registered in the county in which the mortgagor resides, and in case
the mortgagor resides out of the state, then in the county where the
said motor vehicle is situated, in order to obtain immunity against the
creditors and subsequent purchasers for value from the mortgagor.
Following this decision the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in con-
sidering the purpose of the enactment of the Automobile Registration
Acts, said: "Doubtless the law in question was enacted as a means of
a more efficient and certain method of taxation, and as an aid in the
prevention and detection of crime, and not for the purpose of putting
the proof of title to personal property upon a higher plane than the
title to real estate, which may now be established by the ordinary
proofs in actions to determine adverse claims. We are of the opinion
that the statute was passed exclusively for the benefit of the state and
that it, as a registration act, has no application to creditors and ven-
dees of the person who holds the certificate of registration." 2
In the case of Nelson v. Viergiver 8 the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan was of the same opinion. One Hubbard bought a motor truck
on a conditional sale. Possession of the truck was turned over to
Hubbard. The defendant, the sheriff levied on the truck to satisfy
an execution in his hands. The plaintiff replevied it. The plaintiff
insists he was entitled to judgment because Hubbard, in an applica-
tion to the secretary of state according to the Automobile Registra-
tion Act, stated that he held possession under a "conditional sale lien"
and such application was notice to the creditor that he was not the
owner of the truck. The court held that the act, providing for the
issuance of certificates of title of motor vehicles by the secretary of
state, does not amend or supersede the statute requiring conveyances
intended to operate as mortgages of goods and chattels to be recorded.
Thus in the year 1925 we have three notable decisions giving a
definite and certain viewpoint as to the purpose for which these acts
were enacted. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in 1926, gave rise to a
conflict by handing down a decision contra to the aforementioned
ajudicated cases. The defendant, the Warren State Bank, loaned money
on a car and filed the bill of sale received therefrom. Helwig, the
plaintiff, bought the car, thinking it free from all encumbrances, and
2 Amick v. Exchange State Bank, 204 N. W. 639 (Minn. 1925).
8 203 N W. 164 (Mich. 1925).
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filed his bill of sale. Helwig contended that the bill of sale should
have been filed as a chattel mortgage in the office of the county re-
corder. The bank claimed that the filing of the bill of sale was notice
to the whole world of the rights of the holder and whoever became a
holder of an interest in the automobile described in such bill of sale
,took title thereto subject to the rights of the bank. The abridged
decision of the court was: "Under the construction we give the Auto-
mobile Sale and Transfer Acts of Ohio, the title of the defendant was
superior." The court thereby decided that the registration act super-
seded the chattel mortgage recording statute.4
With this Ohio decision in mind it might be well at this point to
consider the purpose for which these two statutes were enacted. The
Ohio Chattel Mortgage Recording Statute is a civil statute designed
to regulate the manner of creating and perfecting liens.5 It was en-
acted some 85 years before the Automobile Sale and Transfer Act
and at that time automobiles had not been invented. Section 6310-10,
of the General Code of Ohio, requiring title of an automobile to be
registered with the secretary of state, is a penal statute. It inflicts a
penalty for failure to register title within three days after said title
has changed hands. Besides being an efficient method of taxation, the
purpose of this statute was to make easier the tracing of stolen cars
and the punishment of offenders." When this act was adopted the
evil of the theft of automobiles was so acute that the Legislature
doubtless felt justified in resorting to extreme measures to remedy
the evil. It is obvious that these two statutes, enacted at widely dif-
ferent dates, refer to widely different subjects. However, the statutes
do not necessarily conflict, in so far as they affect civil rights and
liabilities; rather they are pari materia. For a later statute to repeal
a former statute it is necessary that while also effecting the result
for which it was enacted, it completely effects the result which the
legislature had in view when they enacted the former statute. Although
these statutes run along parallel lines, they do not effect a result
which would make the latter supersede the former.
7
In Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Warren State Bank 8 the Supreme
Court of Ohio handed down a clear cut decision as to relative scope of
operation of each of these statutes. It modified the earlier decision of
Helwig v. Warren State Bank 1 by deciding that bills of sale intended
4 Helwig v. Warren State Bank, 152 N. E. 298 (Ohio 1926).
5 Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Warren State Bank, 158 N. E. 81 (Ohio
1927).
6 Willey v. Willey, 23 Ohio Law Rep. 305.
7 Metropolitan Securities Co.,v. Warren State Bank, op. cit. supra note 5.
8 Op. cit. supra note 5.
9 Op. cit. supra note 4.
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as conveyances intended to operate as a mortgage should be recorded
in the office of the county recorder. In this case one Snyder executed
bills of sale to the Warren State Bank for money loaned him on three
cars. The bank filed the bills of sale according to the requirements of
Section 6310-10, Ohio 'General Code. Later Snyder gave three chattel
mortgages on the cars to the Metropolitan Securities Co., who recorded
the chattel mortgages in compliance with Section 8650, Ohio General
Code. Snyder disappeared and each party now claims ownership of the
three cars. We have, therefore, two mortgagees, one who filed his bill
of sale, the other recorded his chattel mortgage. Was the filing of the
bill of sale sufficient to give notice to the subsequent mortgagee of the
bank's rights to the three cars? The court held that the bills of sale
were given as security for a debt and they are "conveyances intended
to operate as a mortgage," and therefore the proper subject for filing
in the office of the county recorder. The Metropolitan Securities Co.
complied with Section 8650, requiring the recording of chattel mort-
gages, and was therefore entitled to the cars.
In the case of Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer 10 the Supreme
Court of Ohio overruled the decision of Helwig v. Warren State Bank.
The majority of the court were of the opinion that the Automobile
Registration Act of Ohio is a penal statute which was not intended to
affect the validity of contracts, or titles, or rights of property. It was
not designed to repeal or interfere with 'the statutes relating to con-
ditional sales, chattel mortgages, or the uniform law of sales in trans-
actions relating to motor vehicles. Its provisions apply only to the
statute relating to the sale of chattel property by making special pro-
cedure to govern the transfer of title to motor vehicles.
At the present time the courts are of the opinion that the Chattel
Mortgage Recording Statutes and the Automobile Registration Acts
are two entirely different classes of statutes enacted for entirely different
purposes. The Automobile Registration Acts do not, within the scope
of their operation, supersede the Chattel Mortgage Recording Statutes.
Therefore, it is necessary for a person holding a bill of sale intended
as a chattel mortgage to file it with the county recorder in order to
protect himself from rights of creditors and subsequent purchasers.
The latest ajudicated case on this subject is King-Godfrey Inc. v.
Rogers,l decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, May 24, 1932.
This case is in line with the preceding decisions. It will be of interest
to a student of the law to see what the courts of other states will hold
in the future as, in the present era of conditional sales, it is a question
that will arise frequently. Thomas Gately.
10 166 N. E. 808 (Ohio 1929).
11 11 Pac. (2d) 935 (Okka. 1932).
. NOTES
TORTS--NEGLIGENcE-ACTION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF A "JOINT
ENTERPRISE."-Assuming that A and B are engaged in a so-called
"joint enterprise," involving the use of an automobile, is A entitled
to maintain an action against B for injuries sustained due to the negli-
gence of B in driving the car during the continuance of the enterprise?
This question has been considered in a few recent cases. In the case
of Williamson v. Fitzgerald and McConnell I this particular point was
discussed at length by the court even though it held that under the
particular facts of the case the parties were not engaged in a "joint
enterprise." The plaintiff, the two defendants, and a friend of the
plaintiff arranged to take a trip from Stocton to San Francisco to see
a show. The plaintiff was the owner of the car used, but the defend-
ants paid the expenses of the trip. One of the defendants did the
driving. Due to a failure to use ordinary care by the defendant, who
was driving, the automobile tipped over and the plaintiff sustained
serious injuries. The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the Superior
Court and the defendant appealed. In a decision upholding the judg-
ment of the lower court, primarily on the grounds that this was not a
"joint enterprise," Thompson, J., stated that even if this had been a
'"joint enterprise" the plaintiff's right to recover would have been no
less absolute. The major part of his opinion is devoted to this point.
To quote in part, "The doctrine of imputed negligence is applicable
to a member of a joint enterprise or common- adventure when one
member of the enterprise is sued by another thereof for injuries sus-
tained through the negligent operation of an automobile which is be-
ing used in the course of the enterprise. The doctrine of joint enter-
prise is peculiar to the subject of contributory negligence and has
no application to actions brought by one joint adventurer against an-
other to recover injuries due to the latter's negligence." (Italics sup-
plied.)1
O'Brien v. Woldsen 2 is a case directly in point. Mrs. O'Brien, the
plaintiff, and Mrs. Woldsen, the defendant, left Spokane on a pleasure
trip, with the intention of meeting Mr. Woldsen in Seattle. Each of the
ladies was to pay her own expenses, but Mrs. Woldsen was to furnish
the car and Mrs. O'Brien was to buy the gasoline for the automobile.
Due to negligence on the part of the defendant who was driving, the
plaintiff was seriously injured. The court, in a decision written by
Main, J., held that even though this was a "joint enterprise" the
negligence of the defendant could not be imputed to the plaintiff so as
to bar recovery. "When the action is against a third person each
member of the joint enterprise is a representative of the other and
1 2 Pac. (2d) 201, 20S (Cal. App. 1931).
2 270 Pac. 304, 30S (Wash. 1928).
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the acts of one are the acts of all if they are within the scope of
the enterprise. When the action is brought by one member of the
enterprise against another, there is no place to apply the doctrine of
imputed negligence. To do so would be to permit one guilty of negli-
gence to take refuge behind his own wrong."
In Collins v. Collins,s under similar facts establishing a "joint enter-
prise" and the injury of one of the parties because of the negligence
of the other, the court also held that the defendant was not absolved
on the theory of mutual enterprise. District Judge Burgess did not
elaborate on the pertinent question but based his decision on a previous
Wyoming case, viz., Ryan v. Snyder.4 This latter case alone, however,
does not justify such a summary dismissal of the matter since this
action was decided on the grounds that the plaintiff and defendant
were not engaged in a "joint enterprise." On the particular point
in question the decision contains only dicta quoting from Wilmes v.
Fournier.5  Thus, these Wyoming decisions are of little value. In
Bushnell v. Bushnell,8 the plaintiff, while riding in an automobile driv-
en by her husband, was injured when the car ran off the road due to
the husband's (defendant) negligence. In deciding the case in favor
of the plaintiff, Maltbie, J., said: "However it might have been were
the plaintiff suing a third party for injuries due to his negligence in
concurrence with that of her husband, here, where she was charging
him directly with responsibility for injuries due to his own failure in
duty, there was no place for any imputation of his want of care to
her, and the sole issues were those having to do with his negligence and
her own contributory negligence. The doctrine of joint enterprise
was wholly inapplicable to such a situation." In Harber v. Graham 7
the following instruction to a jury was held to be error: "If the jury
find that the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in a common
enterprise at the time of the accident, then, regardless of any question
of negligence, the defendant is entitled to a verdict."
As Professor Rollison points out,8 the dearth of decisions on this
exact point is probably explainable by the fact that "in the majority
of cases there exists the negligence of a third person who can be sued
without any remorse in conscience." In the article cited the author
quotes from Wilmes v. Fournier 9 as follows: "The fact whether
there is a joint enterprise is one of importance in the class of cases
3 260 Pac. 1089 (Wyo. 1927).
4 29 Wyo. 146, 211 Pac. 482 (1923).
5 180 N. Y. Supp. 860, Ill Misc. 9 (1920).
6 131 At. 432, 434 (Conn. 1925).
7 143 AtI. 340, 61 A. L. R. 1232 (N. J. 1928):
8 Rollison, The "Joint Enterprise" in the Law of Imputed Negligence, 6 Notre
Dame Law. 172, 216 (1931).
9 Op. cit. supra note 8, at pp. 216, 217.
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cited, when the action is against a third person; but, as beween them-
selves, I know of no rule of law that throws a mantle of protection
over the tortious acts of an associate in a joint enterprise or in a
partnership."
Cases to the contrary are Frisorger v. Shepse,' 0 Farthing v. Hepin-
stall," and Lawrason v. Richard.12  The last case is contra only by
implication since the facts were not held to constitute a "joint enter-
prise." These cases are criticized in Berlin v. Koblas.13  In his opin-
ion, Dibell, J., points out that these cases, proceeding as they do on
the theory that the associates are so identified that the act of one
is the act of the other, fail to apply the general rule that "a person
in his relations to others, whether through a contract or independently
of one, is liable if his personal negligence results in an injury." The
justice adds that every person has a common law duty or obligation
to so conduct himself as not to injure others. To allow protection
to one member of a "joint enterprise" even though negligent to a
fellow-member would be to abrogate this rule.
Some courts have sought to base the "joint enterprise" doctrine up-
on a relationship analagous to that of a partnership. Quoting from
a California case: "The tendency of modem decisions is to regard
the right of joint adventurers, as between themselves, as governed
practically by the same rules that govern the relation of partnerships." 14
In the conduct of a partnership business, each partner owes the other
a duty to use due care. 15
Other courts hold that the doctrine is based on the control which,
theoretically, each has over the other. Thus it may be considered as
being analagous to a principal and agent relationship.' 6 It is well
settled that an agent is -required to use ordinary care, in conducting
his principal's business, and a failure to do so, which causes the prin-
cipal injury, constitutes negligence for which the agent is responsible.'
7
In the application of the "joint enterprise" doctrine the courts in
speaking of the power of control often leave it uncertain as to whether
10 251 Mich. 121, 230 N. W. 926 (1930).
11 243 Mich. 380, 220 N. W. 708 (1928).
12 129 So. 250 (La. 1930).
1s 236 N. W. 307 (Minn. 1931).
14 Menefee v. Oxnam, 183 Pac. 379, 381 (Cal. App. 1919); Kokesh v. Price,
136 Minn. 304, 161 N. W. 715, 23 A. L. R. 643 (1917).
15 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership (1916) § 758; Gilmore On Partner-
ship, § 28; Childers v. Neely, 47 W. Va. 70, 34 S. E. 828, 49 L. R. A. 408 (1899).
16 Harber v. Graham, op. cit. supra note 7; Farthing v. Hepinstall, op. cit.
supra note 11.
17 Mechem On Agency, § 1275; Garther v. Myrick, 9 Md. 118 (1856).
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they mean an actual control and a failure to exercise it, or a theoreti-
cal power of control which, though not actually existent at the mo-
ment of the accident, seems to be considered as sufficient to impose
a vicarious responsibility upon all of those who for the moment are
considered as having control over the manner and means of executing
the joint undertaking. Certainly, the word "agent" does not connote
anything approaching the idea of an agency as that term is normally
understood.
Where the contributory negligence of the associate who is in actual
control of a means used to carry out a common undertaking is im-
puted to the plaintiff-associate who is suing a third person whose
negligence contributed to the injury, the courts have shown a tendency,
in denying the plaintiff recovery, to hold him to a higher degree of
responsibility for his own safety than a defendant is usually held for
responsibility in injury to third persons generally.
The courts that have given the widest scope of operation to the
doctrine of imputed negligence where a "joint enterprise" is said to
exist are those that have been the last to overthrow the doctrine of
Thorogood v. Bryan 18 or else retain that doctrine. Probably, there-
fore, the "joint enterprise" doctrine represents an effort to salvage
the doctrine of that case.
The conclusions to be drawn from this exception to the imputed
negligence doctrine (of those engaged in a "joint enterprise") may
be more far-reaching than is at first apparent. Is it not a subtle
admission that the theoretical control that forms the basis of the doc-
trine is but a legal fiction; an indirect admission that in reality there
is no control at all? If there be no control, what justification is there
for the "joint enterprise" doctrine? Since no justification is evident,
is not this doctrine only a concession or a peace offering to the equity
of the principle that anyone riding in an automobile who is injured
by the negligence of a third person and the contributory negligence
of the driver should not be allowed to recover from said third person?
But, since the "joint enterprise" doctrine does exist, the influence of
Thorogood v. Bryan must still be felt, and the injustice of holding
third persons responsible to anyone in the other car for accidents which
would not have happened but for the contributory negligence of the
driver is still a legal ghost that haunts our modem law of torts.
Thos. L. McKevtt.
18 8 C. B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 4S2 (1849).
NOTES
CORPORATIONS-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
O O--MANAGING AGENTS.-The question arises as to whether a cor-
poration is to be considered in the same light as a natural person for
the purpose of service of process. Fletcher, in Cyclopedia: Corpora-
tions, answers this question as follows: 1 "It is a close question, and
not debatable that a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning
of the last clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, and it follows that it cannot be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, and that it is
entitled to the equal protection of the law in like manner as other
persons in the same situation. . ." But as "due process bf law" con-
sists in the service of process, and since such service can be made
only upon an agent, we must determine what agents are subject to
service of process. In Ohio a summons against a corporation may be
served upon the president, mayor, chairman, or president of the board
of directors or trustees, or other chief officer; or if its chief officer
is not found within the county, upon its cashier, treasurer, secretary,
clerk or managing agent; or if none of such officers can be found, by
a copy left at the office or usual place of business of the corporation
with the person having charge thereof. In case the corporation is a
railway company or water transportation company, service may be
made upon any regular ticket or freight agent, or if there is no such,
upon any conductor or motorman or upon the master of any vessel.
2
The law is fairly well settled as to what agents may be served in ac-
tions against domestic corporations. Since the state gave the corpora-
tion being, it may regulate its activities and specify definitely what
agents may be served.
Where corporations organized and existing under the statutes of a
state foreign to the one in which the corporations are acting must be
served with process, the question is not so simple. Should the state in
which a foreign corporation was organized determine what agents are
capable of being served with process, and should all other states abide
by that determination under the provisions of Article IV, section 1, of
the Constitution of the United States, providing for full faith and
credit to be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state, on the theory that the creation of a
corporation and the designation of agents upon whom process may be
served by the legislature of a state are public acts? Or should the
state in which the corporation is doing business determine what agents
1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (1931 ed.), §7 and cases cited. But
see Western Turf Association, Plf. in Error, v. Hyman Greenbery, 402 U. S. 359
(1906) (Syllabus 4).
2 Ohio General Code (1926), § 11288.
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can be served? These questions were answered by the United States
District Court in Missouri, in 1928, when it held that each "state
may prescribe exclusive method for service of process on foreign cor-
porations doing business therein." 3
It is important to note that the corporation must be doing business
within the state, to give the courts of that state jurisdiction over
the foreign corporation at all. If one of the chief officers of a corpora-
tion of another state happens to be in the state for purely personal
reasons, or for reasons not connected with'the business of the corpo-
ration, he is not subject to service of summons on the corporation.
4
Thus the Ohio courts hold that where the president of a foreign cor-
poration is in the state for the sole purpose of attending a convention,
he is not doing business within the meaning of the statute.
5
Having established the fact that a state may lawfully determine
the method of service of process upon foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within its territory, we can inquire as to the methods employed
towards that end in Ohio. Before a corporation of another state begins
the transaction of business in Ohio,6 it should apply to the Secretary
of State of Ohio for permission to transact such business. The Secretary
of State will require such foreign corporation to file in his office a
statement under its corporate seal setting forth, among other things,
the name of a person designated by the corporation upon whom
service of process against the corporation may be made within the
state.7 If the foreign corporation has complied with this rule, the
procedure in bringing suit against it is simply to find out from the
Secretary of State who the designated agent is, and then to serve
the agent with summons.
But it may sometimes, and in fact often does, happen that the
corporation neglects to file such a statement. Sometimes the designated
agent neglects to file the statement or leaves the state so as to be
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, or is discharged, or for some
other reason cannot be served with process. In this event, the Gen-
3 Thompson v. National Life Ins. Co. of U. S. of America, 28 Fed. (2d)
877 (1928). An appeal from this decision was dismissed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, 28 Fed. (2d) 1020.
4 Selbert v. Lancaster Chocolate & Caramel Co., 23 Fed. (2d) 233 (1928),
decided by the U. S. C. C. in Ohio.
5 Hurd v. Ransom & Co., 13 Ohio App. 135 (1920).
6 See Southwark Foundry v. Mach. Co., 48 Fed. (2d) 714 (1931), where
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Ohio holds that "in Ohio process
may be served by any one of designated statutory methods, upon foreign corpor-
ations within the state in any action upon which the corporation is exercising
franchises within the state with its consent, such corporation then being amena-
ble to suit within the state."
7 Ohio General Code (1926), § 179.
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eral Code of 1926 provides that if the corporation has a "managing
agent" in the state he may be served.8 This is the only way in which
service can be had upon a foreign corporation in Ohio, aside from
serving the designated agent. 9
The question is constantly arising as to who is a "managing agent"
within the meaning of the statute. This question is of the utmost im-
portance to the practicing attorney, for with the modern spread of
chain stores, nation-wide gasoline and oil companies, and the general
tendency to consolidate small domestic corporations into large foreign
ones, and to merge the privately owned business with corporate en-
terprises, he is likely to find himself many times during his career
either suing or defending a foreign corporation, and his ability to
judge whether or not a particular individual is a managing agent of
the foreign corporation will often determine the outcome of the case.
It is the opinion of the courts that section 11920 of the Ohio Gen-
eral Code should be liberally construed.10 This section acts as a
double edged sword; it is intended to protect the rights of the foreign
corporation, but it also serves to give the Ohio courts jurisdiction over
the foreign corporation which has been doing business with the citizens
of the state so as to enable such citizens to conveniently sue the for-
eign corporation. Were the statute to be interpreted too technically,
the corporations of other states would be able to maintain a business
in Ohio, without having anyone eligible to be served in the State,
thereby avoiding suit in courts of Ohio and forcing the citizens of this
State to bring suit in another state where service could be had on
the corporation, which state of affairs would be manifestly unjust.
8 Ohio General Code (1926), § 11290. See also.Maichok v. Bertha-Con-
sumers Co., 25 Fed. (2d) 257 (1928), holding that a return of summons by
sheriff showing service on managing agent in Ohio is a good return.
1) Cora Daw v. Ohio Valley Druggists Association, et al., 16 Ohio Dec. (n. p.)
568 (1906), which says in part that "It is the accepted rule that Rev. Stat.
5043, 5041 (not General Code §§ 11288, 11290) relating to service of summons
on a corporation, are exclusive of each other" and that the latter provides the
only mode of serving a foreign corporation with summons, aside from serving the
designated agent.
10 Israel v. Champion 'Shoe Mach. Co., 3 Ohio Law Abs. 512 (1925),
holding that "statute oroviding for service of summons upon the 'managing agent'
of a foreign corporation, should be liberally construed in order to make it easier
to obtain jurisdiction over such foreign corporation doing business within the
state."
Wright, J., in The Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. The Wheeling, Parkersburg,
and Cincinnati Trans. Co., et. al., 32 Ohio St. 116 (1877), says: "The tendency
of legislation and the policy of the law is to facilitate the obtaining of service
upon foreign corporations. Their business brings them in such close connection
with the people of our state, that it is desirable they should be made amen-able
to our laws as far as practicable, instead of having our citizens to seek other
jurisdictions in which to enforce their rights:"
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"In general it may be said that he [the managing agent] is one
having general supervision over the affairs of the corporation, or at
least some part of it." 11 This does not mean one having control of
any part whatsoever of the affairs of the corporation is subject to
service against the corporation; to be subject to service the agent
must have control of some substantial part of the corporate business
of the corporation. 12 What is a substantial part, so as to constitute
the controller thereof a managing agent is a question of fact to be
determined by the evidence in each particular case.' 3 Such an agent
must actually be in control of the business of the corporation; he
cannot merely be presumed to be so by any implication of law con-
trary to the intention of the parties.'
4
As indicated above, service against foreign corporations in Ohio
must be made upon either a designated or a managing agent. So where
a corporation had designated an agent upon whom process could be
served, and the sheriff served a summons on the person in charge of
the usual place of business of the foreign corporation and made a re-
turn as upon "M. J. Riggs, superintendent of said company," the
court held that this was not a proper service within the meaning of
the statute and the service was quashed. 15 Whether the court would
have held this service good had there been no designated agent and
had there been evidence tending to show that Riggs was in fact a
managing agent must be left to conjecture. But it is probable that it
would have been held good under the rule laid down above that the
section providing for service of process upon managing agents should
be liberally construed, and that the sheriff would have been allowed
to amend his return so as to read "managing agent" instead of "super-
intendent." 16 This conjecture is supported by Toledo Computing
11 10 Ohio Jurisprudence, 1240.
See also Bucket Pump .Co. v. Eagle Iron and Steel Co., 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. 229,
230, 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 418 (1900), which cites Anderson's Law Dictionary and
Upper Mississippi Trans. Co. v. Whittaker, 16 Wis. 233 (1862), and holds that
"managing agent" implies control of some part of the business of the corpora-
tion.
12 Cora Daw Goode v. Ohio Valley Druggists Association, (syllabus 3),
o'. cit: supra note 9 (syllabus 3).
13 Masemann v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 7 Ohio Law Abs. 245 (1929),
which holds that the determination of this question depends upon the power
vested in the agent as representative of the foreign corporation.
14 United States v. -American Bell Tele. Co., 55 Ohio Fed. Dec. 558, 29 Fed.
17 (1886). But if he be a designated agent it is not necessary that he have such
control.
15 State ex rel. v. King Bridge Co., 18 Ohio Cir. Dec. 147, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct.
(N. S.) 557, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. 147, (1906).
16 Israel v. Champion Shoe Mach. Co., op. cit. supra note 10 (syllabus 2).
The opinion says in part: ". . . the company sent Westfall inta the state to test
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Scale Co. v. Computing "Scale Co.,17 which holds that "A person who
.chiefly represents a corporation as agent for the sale of goods in a
locality in the State and who maintains an office or store room where
such goods are kept, is a managing agent, although he is paid only by
commissions on sales made within his district." A superintendent
would, no doubt, be the chief representative of his company within the
district, and so could very probably have been held to be a managing
agent if, in the opinion of the court, the equity of the case required it.
The theory underlying the various decisions on this subject seems
to be one of agency.' 8 If the person served with process is a general
agent (i. e., one having general control of the business of the foreign
corporation) the service is good, but if he is a special agent (i. e.,
one having authority from the foreign corporation to do only a par-
ticular act, or particular acts), or a servant of the corporation, the
service is not good. To illustrate: Where there "was a general 'super-
intendent' for the State at Cleveland, and two 'local agents' in the
county of Madison; one of whom resided at London, in said county,
and kept an office there, where he received and forwarded packages
for the company, and did all the business of the company usually
transacted in such receiving and forwarding offices," and service was
made upon the agent at London alone, it was held that the service
was good.' 9 This agent clearly was a general agent. But where the
defendant, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of West
Virginia, merely had an agent in Ohio to receive what was sent to
him, and to remit back proceeds, the agent was held not to be a man-
aging agent.20 This agent had no general authority to conduct the
affairs of the corporation and so was a special agent. A kindred case
is where the corporation sent one of its directors into Ohio to collect
payments on subscriptions for lands of the corporation and that di-




machinery, to look after proper installation, to collect money, etc. It had no
other representative here but Westfall, with respect to its business, he was its
managing agent within the meaning and intent of the statute."
17 74 C. C. A. 89, 142 Fed. 919 (1906). Explained in Charles Beach v.
Kerr Turbine Co., 62 Ohio Law Bul. 400 (1917). Followed in Railway Co. v.
Newman, 16 Ohio App. 156 (1922).
18 See note 13 supra.
19 American Express Co. v. Johnson, 17 Ohio St. 641 (1867). Affirmed in
Railway Co. v. Newman, op. cit. supra note 17, and in Israel v. Champion Shoe
Mach. Co., op. cit. supra note 10.
20 Patrick Gibbon v. The Kanawha and Ohio Coal Co., 2 Cin. Sup. Ct.
Rep. 75 (1870).
21 Amy B. Foote v. Central American Commercial Co., 26 Ohio Cir. Ct.
378 (1904).
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In order to establish the fact that an agent is, or is not, a manag-
ing agent, the affidavit of the agent himself or of one of the chief
officers of the defendant company is admissible as evidence. In State
ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co.,2 2 the defendant corporation had a local
agent in Lucas County who was served with summons against the cor-
poration. The sheriff made a return that he had served A. the "man-
aging agent of said company in Lucas County." This was met by an
affidavit by the vice-president of the defendant company, in which he
stated that A. was not and never had been its managing agent, but
was an agent in charge of a local station. It was held that, as there
was nothing to show that A. was a managing agent, except the return,
the court would rely upon the affidavit and quash service. It was held,
in the same case, that "a return which recites that summons was
served on B, 'assistant cashier and treasurer of the company,' is also
open to a motion to quash, where met by an affidavit by B which
removes the uncertainty as to whether he is the treasurer of the de-
fendant company by stating explicitly that he is the 'assistant cashier
and assistant treasurer,' and the return fails to show absence from the
county of all the chief officers and other officers named in the statute 23
upon whom service may be made, or that the summons was left with
B at the usual place of business of the defendant corporation, he being
the person in charge thereof."
Where the service is made upon one not a designated agent nor a
managing agent of the defendant foreign corporation one of three
things may happen: (1) the sheriff may return the summons as "not
summoned," 24 (2) the service may be set aside on motion,25 or (3)
there may be a motion to quash service.2 6 But "a party upon whose
pleading summons has been issued is not required, upon discovery that
good service has not been made, to wait until the original summons
has been returned 'not summoned' or some action has been taken
by the court before causing an alias summons to issue, but may pro-
ceed at once to secure service upon another writ within the life of the
original summons." 27
22 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 212.
23 Ohio General Code (1926) § 11288. This citation applies to domestic
corporations, but the same rule would apply were the process against a foreign
corporation served against the agent of a foreign corporation, in which case he
could aver that he was not the managing agent of said company.
24 State ex rel. v. Oil Co., op. cit. supra note 22.
25 Patrick Gibbon v. The Kanawha and Ohio Coal Co., op. cit. supra note 20.
26 State ex rel. v. Oil Co., op. cit. supra note 22.
27 State ex rel. v. Oil Co., op. cit. supra note 22.
